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  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3122 
_____________ 
 
IN RE: HYPODERMIC PRODUCTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
 
 
AMERICAN SALES COMPANY, INC; SAJ DISTRIBUTORS, INC;  
LOUISIANA WHOLESALE DRUG CO INC; ROCHESTER DRUG CO-OP 
INC; JM SMITH CORPORATION; DIK DRUG; PARK SURGICAL CO., INC.,  
                                                                                 Petitioners 
________________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
District Court No. 2-05-cv-01602 
District Judge: The Honorable Jose L. Linares 
                               
 
Argued May 17, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
and STEARNS, District Judge*
 
 
(Filed:June 5, 2012) 
 
                                                          
* The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the United States 
District Court of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
  
This appeal entails a consolidated class action involving two groups of plaintiffs 
alleging that defendant-appellee Becton Dickinson & Co. (“Becton”), a manufacturer of 
hypodermic products,1 violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.  The 
two plaintiffs’ groups are: (i) distributors of Becton’s hypodermic products 
(“Distributors”);2 and (ii) certain hospitals and clinics that purchase Becton’s hypodermic 
products (“Healthcare Providers”)3 (collectively, Distributors and Healthcare Providers 
are the “Plaintiffs”).4
                                                          
1 The hypodermic products are the following devices and their associated needles: 
disposable syringes; blood collection devices; winged IV devices; and IV catheter 
devices.   
  The discrete issue on appeal is which group of Plaintiffs, 
Distributors or Healthcare Providers, has standing under the direct-purchaser rule to 
pursue the federal antitrust claims related to the contract sales of Becton’s hypodermic 
  
2 The Distributors, who are the plaintiff-appellants, are: American Sales Co., Inc.; Dik 
Drug Co.; J M Smith Corp.; Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc.; Park Surgical Co., Inc.; 
Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc.; and SAJ Distributors, Inc. 
  
3 The Healthcare Providers, who are the plaintiff-appellees, are: MedStar Health Inc.; 
MedStar-Georgetown Medical Center, Inc.; National Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc.; and 
Washington Hospital Center Corporation.   
Other plaintiff healthcare providers, such as Hebrew Home for the Aged, chose 
not to participate as appellees.  Nonetheless, this decision applies to all plaintiff 
healthcare providers in this action, regardless of whether they chose to respond as 
appellees in this appeal.   
 
4 The Healthcare Providers claim that there is a third group of plaintiffs, the indirect 
purchasers (e.g., retail pharmacies), but that group has not asserted any issues on appeal.  
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products.  The District Court ruled on summary judgment that Healthcare Providers, not 
Distributors, were the direct purchasers and have exclusive standing to pursue these 
claims.  We will reverse.   
I. BACKGROUND 
A. BECTON’S DISTRIBUTION OF HYPODERMIC PRODUCTS 
Plaintiffs allege that Becton maintained a dominant share of the markets for the 
hypodermic products, employed various anticompetitive practices to eliminate 
competition and achieve monopoly positions in the relevant markets, and utilized these 
advantages to charge purchasers higher prices.  Although Becton sells the hypodermic 
products through two channels (i.e., contract sales and non-contract sales), only Becton’s 
contract sales are at issue here.   
1. CONTRACT SALES  
Contract sales, which account for approximately 74% of Becton’s sales, involve 
three primary contracts: a Net Dealer Contract (“NDC”); a Distribution Agreement; and a 
Dealer Notification Agreement (“DNA”).   
Net Dealer Contract 
NDCs are agreements between a manufacturer of medical products and a group 
purchasing organization (“GPO”).  GPOs are entities that negotiate prices of products and 
other terms and conditions on behalf of their member healthcare providers.  GPOs do not 
purchase or sell any products themselves.  By negotiating on behalf of many healthcare 
providers, GPOs are generally able to negotiate lower prices than the manufacturers’ list 
prices.          
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Here, Novation, which is a GPO that represented Healthcare Providers, entered 
into an NDC with Becton for the sale and purchase of the hypodermic products.  
Although the NDC provided that Novation’s members would have the option of 
purchasing hypodermic products pursuant to the NDC, the members were not obligated 
to make any purchases under the NDC.  The NDC required that Becton make the 
hypodermic products “available for purchase by [Distributors] at the [a]ward [p]rices for 
resale to [Healthcare Providers].”  (JA3926.)  Under the NDC Distributors, on behalf of 
Healthcare Providers, were to submit orders for hypodermic products to Becton; Becton 
would then deliver those products to, and invoice, Distributors; and Distributors were 
responsible for paying Becton pursuant to the rates set forth in the NDC.  Notably, the 
NDC did not specify any particular distributor or means of distribution, nor did it purport 
to set the final price at which Distributors would resell the hypodermic products to 
Healthcare Providers.   
Distribution Agreement 
After an NDC is executed, the GPO notifies its members of the agreement’s terms 
and conditions.  Members who wish to participate in the NDC must notify the 
manufacturer of their intentions.   
The participating members then separately negotiate and execute Distribution 
Agreements with their respective distributors.  The Distribution Agreement governs the 
terms and conditions of the distributor’s transaction with the member hospital, and 
generally includes: the price the member will pay to the distributor for the products; any 
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service fees the distributor may charge the member; and any other terms related to the 
transaction.     
Here, Novation informed its members of the NDC with Becton.  Healthcare 
Providers executed letters of commitment with Becton, notifying Becton that it should 
charge their distributor the agreed upon NDC price for the hypodermic products.   
Healthcare Providers also entered into Distribution Agreements with their 
respective distributors and notified Becton of their distribution relationships.  For 
example, appellee MedStar Health (“MedStar”), a Healthcare Provider and named 
plaintiff, negotiated and entered into a Distribution Agreement with Cardinal Company 
(“Cardinal”), a distributor, for the sale and delivery of, inter alia, the hypodermic 
products.  MedStar agreed to submit orders directly to Cardinal.  Cardinal was 
responsible for obtaining the requested hypodermic products from Becton, delivering 
them to MedStar, and invoicing Medstar.  MedStar agreed to pay Cardinal an amount 
equal to the price Cardinal paid to purchase the products from Becton plus a markup, line 
fee, or an activity fee on a per-purchase-order basis.     
Dealer Notification Agreement  
After the member identifies its distributor, the manufacturer generally enters into 
some type of agreement with the distributor governing the terms and conditions of their 
relationship.   
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Here, Becton entered into Dealer Notification Agreements with Distributors.  
These agreements referred to Distributors as Becton’s “servicing agent[s].”  (JA5626.)5
The DNA also governs Becton’s payment and rebate system.  Becton’s list prices 
for the hypodermic products — i.e., the prices Becton charges distributors in non-contract 
sales — is higher than the prices set forth in contract sales under an NDC.  Becton is 
concerned that distributors will obtain products from Becton at the lower NDC price and 
resell those products in non-contract sales.  To protect against such behavior, Becton 
invoices Distributors at the higher list price for all shipments it makes to them.  
Subsequently, if a Distributor provides proof that it delivered the products to a customer 
pursuant to an NDC, then Becton issues a rebate to that Distributor for the difference 
between the higher list price that was invoiced and the lower contract price set forth in 
the NDC.   
  
Under the DNAs, the member hospitals may submit orders directly to Distributors, and 
Distributors are to regard these orders as purchase orders from Becton.  The DNAs 
require Distributors to ship the products within 3-6 days and invoice the member 
hospitals on behalf of Becton.   
Moreover, the DNA also governs the products’ title.  Pursuant to the DNA, title to 
the products transferred from Becton to Distributors upon their shipment to Distributors.  
However, once Distributors shipped the products to a customer in a contract sale, title 
                                                          
5 Becton asserts that since 2006, its DNA no longer referred to distributors as its servicing 
agents.     
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reverted back to Becton and was then transferred to the end customer once the delivery 
was completed.6
Operation of the Hypodermic Products’ Supply Chain for Contract Sales  
   
 The operation of the supply chain appears straightforward: (1) a Distributor orders 
a large volume of hypodermic products from Becton.  These orders are for anticipated 
contract and non-contract sales (i.e., Distributors do not know at that time which products 
it orders from Becton will be part of a contract sale).  Becton ships these products to and 
invoices the Distributor at the distributor list price, not the NDC price.  The Distributor 
takes title to the products, warehouses them, insures them against loss, and pays Becton; 
(2) a Healthcare Provider submits a request to its Distributor to purchase certain 
hypodermic products; (3)  the Distributor ships the products to — and invoices — the 
Healthcare Provider as set forth in their Distribution Agreement; (4) the Healthcare 
Provider pays the Distributor directly for the products and the markup/line-fee/activity-
fee; and (5) the Distributor applies for a rebate from Becton within 45 days of the end of 
the month in which the Distributor’s transaction with the Healthcare Provider occurred, 
and Becton pays the rebate to the Distributor.  
2. NON-CONTRACT SALES 
Non-contract sales, which account for the remaining 26% of Becton’s sales for 
hypodermic products, are those sales of the hypodermic products that were not made 
pursuant to an NDC.  The District Court ruled that Distributors were the direct purchasers 
                                                          
6 Becton asserts that since 2006, the DNAs no longer state that title reverts to Becton 
upon Distributors’ shipment of the products to customers.   
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of Becton’s hypodermic products that they resold pursuant to non-contract sales.  
Healthcare Providers have not appealed that determination, and thus, Distributors’ non-
contract sales are not at issue on appeal.   
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In 2005, several of the Distributors filed class action complaints alleging that 
Becton — in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 
and 2) and Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15) — illegally acquired and 
maintained monopoly power over sales of the hypodermic products and charged 
Distributors unlawfully inflated prices.  The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the 
“MDL Panel”) consolidated these cases in the District of New Jersey.   
 In 2006, MedStar and several of the other Healthcare Providers filed class action 
complaints against Becton, alleging the same underlying conduct asserted in Distributors’ 
complaints.  The MDL Panel also consolidated these cases in the District of New Jersey.   
      On April 27, 2009, Distributors and Becton agreed upon a conditional settlement.  
Under the conditional settlement, Becton would make a $45 million cash payment to a 
proposed class of entities similarly situated to Distributors in exchange for dismissal of 
their complaints with prejudice and certain releases.  The settlement was contingent upon 
the District Court determining that Distributors, not Healthcare Providers, had standing 
under the Clayton Act to pursue antitrust claims against Becton.  In accordance with the 
conditional settlement agreement, Distributors filed motions seeking: (a) certification of 
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the proposed class7
 On September 30, 2010, the District Court, focusing on the “economic substance” 
of the hypodermic products’ supply chain, granted Healthcare Providers’ motion for 
partial summary judgment on the issue of direct-purchaser standing (the “Order”), 
holding that Healthcare Providers, not Distributors, were the direct purchasers of 
Becton’s hypodermic products.     
 and preliminary approval of the proposed settlement; and (b) partial 
summary judgment on the issue of direct-purchaser standing.  Becton also moved for 
preliminary approval of the proposed settlement.  Healthcare Providers opposed the 
motions by Distributors and Becton and filed a cross motion for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of direct-purchaser standing.   
 On November 23, 2010, the District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, certified 
its Order for interlocutory appeal.  On July 22, 2011, we granted Distributors’ petition for 
permission to appeal under § 1292(b).   
                                                          
7 Distributors defined the class as:  
 
All persons or entities (and assignees of claims from such persons and 
entities) who (1) purchased BD Hypodermic Products in the United States 
from BD at any time during the period of March 23, 2001 through April 27, 
2009 (the “Class Period”), and (2) were invoiced by BD for said purchases 
(the “Direct Purchaser Class”).   
 
The Direct Purchaser Class excludes BD, BD’s parents, subsidiaries and 
affiliates, and United States Government Entities and those persons or 
entities who are permitted by the Court to opt out of the Direct Purchaser 
Class. 
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II. ANALYSIS8
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that “any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”  15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  The Supreme Court has 
limited the scope of § 4 through the direct-purchaser rule, which states that only the 
immediate buyer of a product has standing to maintain a federal antitrust action.  See, 
e.g., Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 206-09 (1990) (holding that only the 
direct purchaser has standing to bring federal antitrust claims even where the direct 
purchaser may pass the entire unlawful overcharge to downstream purchasers); Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977) (holding that an indirect purchaser 
lacked standing to pursue federal antitrust claims); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489-91 (1968) (rejecting the alleged antitrust violator’s 
argument that the direct purchasers of its goods lacked standing to pursue federal antitrust 
claims because those purchasers passed on the alleged overcharges to downstream 
 
                                                          
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  
We review the District Court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion de 
novo, applying the same standard as the District Court.  Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 
385 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007)).  “The 
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  All inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
587 (1986).  “The issue of antitrust standing is a legal issue, over which we exercise 
plenary review.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 847 (3d Cir. 1996)).    
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customers); see also McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., 80 F.3d 842, 848 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(interpreting UtiliCorp, Illinois Brick, and Hanover Shoe as “enunciating a bright-line 
rule that only a purchaser immediately downstream from the alleged monopolist may 
bring an antitrust action”). 
 Our recent decision in Warren General Hospital v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77 (3d 
Cir. 2011), issued after the decision we now review, is particularly instructive.  There, a 
hospital plaintiff sued a pharmaceutical manufacturer, asserting an illegal tying claim 
under federal antitrust laws.  Id. at 80.  The hospital purchased the products at issue 
through contract sales, which involved a GPO-negotiated contract structuring the supply 
chain so that the manufacturer would sell the products to wholesalers, who in turn would 
resell those products to the member hospitals.  Id. at 83.  The district court ruled that the 
hospital was an indirect purchaser and dismissed the complaint.  Id. at 79.   
In affirming the district court’s decision, we focused on the “mechanics of the 
transactions” between the hospital, the wholesaler, and the manufacturer.  Id. at 79, 88.  
In particular, we noted that: (1) when the hospital wants to purchase the products at issue, 
it places an order through the wholesaler; (2) the wholesaler negotiates the final sales 
price of the products separately with the hospital; (3) the hospital physically takes 
delivery of the shipment from the wholesaler; and (4) the hospital pays the wholesaler 
directly and does not transmit funds to the manufacturer.  Id. at 88.  Thus, we determined 
that the hospital’s purchases “go through at least one other stage in the chain of 
distribution” before reaching the hospital, and that the hospital was an indirect purchaser 
that lacked standing.  Id. 
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Here, the mechanics of the distribution chain for Becton’s hypodermic products 
are essentially identical to those that were at issue in Warren General.  Most notably: (1) 
when Healthcare Providers needed hypodermic products, they placed orders through 
Distributors; (2) Distributors negotiated the final sales price of the hypodermic products 
separately with the Healthcare Providers; (3) Distributors physically shipped the products 
to Healthcare Providers; and (4) Healthcare Providers paid Distributors directly and did 
not transmit funds to Becton.  Thus, because the hypodermic products pass through at 
least one other stage in the chain of distribution before reaching Healthcare Providers, the 
Distributors, not Healthcare Providers, are the direct purchasers in contract sales.9  See, 
e.g., Warren General, 643 F.3d at 88.10
                                                          
9 We are not persuaded by Healthcare Providers’ attempt to distinguish Warren General.  
Healthcare Providers argue that, unlike the wholesalers in Warren General, Distributors 
were acting as Becton’s servicing agents for the contract sales, and thus, the hypodermic 
product supply chain had only one transaction between Becton/Distributors on one hand 
and Healthcare Providers on the other.  Even assuming, without deciding, that Healthcare 
Providers are correct both that Distributors were acting as the servicing agents for Becton 
in contract sales and that servicing agents cannot be direct purchasers as a matter of law, 
the Healthcare Providers are still indirect purchasers because the products had already 
passed through at least one other stage in the chain of distribution before Distributors 
acted as Becton’s servicing agents.  As discussed supra, at the time that Distributors 
receive the hypodermic products from Becton, title to those products and the associated 
risks of ownership and loss transfer to Distributors, who warehouse these fungible 
products in their inventory without knowing whether any will be the subject of a contract 
sale.  Becton invoices Distributors for all of these hypodermic products at the higher list 
price.  Thus, the hypodermic products already passed through a stage in the chain of 
distribution before they could be the subject of any contract sale in which Distributors 
allegedly act as Becton’s servicing agents.        
 
 
10 We recognize that the District Court, which issued its Order prior to our decision in 
Warren General, did not have the benefit of our position on this issue.  
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Accordingly, we will reverse.11
  
 
                                                          
11 On October 17, 2011, Distributors and Becton filed a joint motion to seal their 
appellate briefs and Volumes 1 and 3-12 of the Joint Appendix (the “First Sealing 
Motion”).  Distributors and Becton reasoned that these materials included documents or 
references to documents that were filed under seal with the District Court pursuant to a 
protective order.  Healthcare Providers opposed the First Sealing Motion to the extent 
that it sought to seal publicly-available documents.  On October 31, 2011, after 
consulting with the Clerk’s Office, Distributors and Becton filed another joint motion 
requesting leave to strike portions of the Joint Appendix and to file a supplemental 
redacted appendix containing the unsealed documents (the “Second Sealing Motion”).  
Healthcare Providers have not opposed the Second Sealing Motion except to the extent 
that it seals the District Court’s Order and Decision underlying this appeal, which was 
sealed by the District Court.  On December 5, 2011, Healthcare Providers filed a motion 
to seal their reply brief for the instant appeal (the “Third Sealing Motion”) because it 
references matters that were filed under seal before the District Court.  We will deny the 
First Sealing Motion and grant both the Second and Third Sealing Motions.  Because 
these motions did not specify a desired duration for the sealing order, we will direct the 
Clerk’s Office to seal the materials subject to the aforementioned motions for five years 
from the conclusion of the case, after which the materials shall be unsealed without 
notice to the parties.  See Local App. R. 106.1(c)(2). 
 
